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Unlike most of the "procedural" reforms being considered in this
conference, reforms seeking to broaden the remedies available in
WTO dispute settlement proceedings cannot be regarded as
"technical" issues. Because remedial measures directly affect the
level of enforcement pressures applied to governments in
violation of WTO obligations, changes in this area confront the
central issue of how strong the WTO member governments want
their legal system to be.'
I. INTRODUCTION

In 1995, the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations
made a unique contribution to the multilateral trading system in the
process of creating the WTO: the dispute settlement mechanism (DSM).
Founded on the notion that a strong dispute settlement mechanism with
sound enforcement mechanism was essential to the functioning of the
new multilateral trading institution, the DSM has rightly been hailed as
its crown jewel; as the backbone of the WTO. Indeed, the continued
usage and confidence reposed by Members of the WTO in resolving
trade disputes stands testimony to the success and pivotal importance of
the DSM. 2
However, the DSM has also drawn flak for having certain
inadequacies. Members and scholars have identified certain drawbacks
and shortcomings in certain aspects. Some of the shortcomings that
have been discussed are: the lack of a standing panel, 3 the absence of
remand authority with the Appellate Body,4 Remedies, which form the
1. See generally Robert E. Hudec, Broadening the Scope of Remedies in WTO Dispute
Settlement, in IMPROVING WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PROCEDURES 345-76 (Friedlweiss &

Jochemwiers eds., 2000), availableat http://www.worldtradelaw.net/articles/hudecremedies.pdf.
2. For a recent note on the functioning of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism, see
generally H.E. Mr. Yonov Frederick Agah, WTO Dispute Settlement Body Developments in
2010: An Analysis, 4 TRADE L. & DEV. 241 (2012).

3.

Debra Steger, Establishment of a Dispute Tribunal in the WTO in TRADE AND

DEVELOPMENT SYMPOSIUM: PERSPECTIVES ON THE MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM 3 (2011),

availableat http://ssm.com/abstract=2065448.
4. Joost Pauwelyn, Appeal without Remand: A Design Flaw in the WTO Dispute
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backbone of the DSM; the final astras that a Member may invoke to
enforce its rights against a violating Member state have also been
subject to a certain level of criticism. Some of these shortcomings have
come to be identified in the course of its functioning; some come to
light when the DSM is compared to a domestic adjudicatory system.
In the context of remedies, a subtle difference that distinguishes the
WTO DSM from most domestic adjudicatory systems is the absence of
provisional measures 5 available to Members in the DSM. Concerns
about the lack of provisions for provisional measures in the DSU have
been raised by the WTO's Members in the DSU review negotiations.
One of the very first Members to suggest the incorporation of
provisional measures in the DSU was Mexico. 6 The problem of the lack
of provisional measures was succinctly identified by Mexico: "the
fundamental problem of the WTO dispute settlement system lies in the
period of time during which a WTO-inconsistent measure can be in
place without the slightest consequence." 7 Mexico very correctly
identified the absence of provisional remedies as a "fundamental
problem" in the WTO dispute settlement system. Mexico further stated:
"There is currently no mechanism available for a Member challenging a
WTO-inconsistent measure to recover the losses resulting from that
measure. Illegal measures may be in place for more than three years
before a complaining party can
8 obtain compensation or suspend
concessions or other obligations."
Mexico's proposal was evaluated by several other WTO Members
who had an overall positive response in subsequent deliberations.
According to Malaysia, the concept of provisional measures warranted
further debate and elaboration and that "the concept was not completely
alien for many Members who had been involved in arbitration or any9
other adjudication process at international and national levels."
Observations on the need for prompt settlement of disputes and the
probability of suffering damages while awaiting conclusion of the0
dispute settlement process were appreciated by the United States.'
Settlement and How to Fix It, ICTSD DISPUTE SETTLEMENT AND LEGAL ASPECTS OF
1,
at
4,
available
at
TRADE
ISSUE
PAPER
No.
INTERNATIONAL

http://ictsd.org/i/publications/I 1301/.
5. The term "provisional measures" is a broad term and encompasses different types of
measures including preliminary injunctions, attachment of property, etc. However, for the
purposes of this paper, I am primarily basing my Essay on preliminary injunctions.
6. Special Session of the Dispute Settlement Body, Negotiations on Improvements and
Clarificationsof the Dispute Settlement Understanding,at 2, TN/DS/W/23 (Nov. 4, 2002).
7. Id. at 1.
8. Id.
9. Special Session of the Dispute Settlement Body, Minutes of the Meeting, at 2,
TN/DS/M/15 (June 4, 2004).
10. Id. at 3.
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India made a very important recommendation: the need to clarify the
terms "urgency," "serious harm or injury" and an indication be given as
to who would determine their occurrence." According to Thailand, a
system of provisional measures would enhance the credibility of the
dispute settlement system and also the WTO as a whole. 12 In addition to
ideas of the WTO Members on the need for provisional measures, it
would be interesting to note that the WTO itself has been forthcoming
in this regard and has acknowledged the absence
3 of provisional
measures as a weakness in its online training module.'
In this Essay, I revisit the idea of equipping the WTO DSM with
provisional measures. Though the idea of provisional measures is not
novel, a limited amount of scholarship 14 has been generated on the topic
of provisional measures when compared to other topics in WTO dispute
settlement such as retaliation and the reasonable period of time for
implementation. Even on the political front, not much deliberation has
taken place since Mexico's proposal for provisional measures during the
DSU review negotiations. With the DSU review negotiations having
been stalled, it is uncertain as to when any further discussions on the
topic of provisional measures would emerge in the near future.
Nonetheless, in light of the increasing number of disputes at the
WTO-a testimony to the notion that WTO Members repose their faith
and confidence in the WTO DSM-it would be ideal to keep alive
discussions on the need to continue strengthening and reforming the
DSM. In this Essay, I advocate the need to incorporate provisional
measures in the WTO DSM. This article aims at justifying the need to
incorporate provisional measures at the WTO DSM.
The structure of this Essay is as follows: before discussing the
justifications for incorporating provisional measures at the DSM, I
present a brief overview of the nature, purpose and working of
provisional measures in the context of domestic dispute settlement
mechanisms in Part II. In Part III, which is the crux of this Essay, I
11.
12.
13.

Id.
Id.
12.3 Strengths and Weaknesses, World Trade Organization, http://www.wto.org/

english/tratope/dispu~e/dispsettlement cbt e/cl2s3pl-e.htm. The absence of provisional
measures has been identified as a weakness of the DSM by certain scholars as well. See, e.g.,
Emst-Ulrich Petersmann, Ten Years of the WTO Dispute Settlement System: Past, Present, and
Future, 3 J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 1, 6 (1996).

14. In comparison to the scholarship on other aspects of WTO dispute settlement, there
are few works that have focused specifically on the topic of provisional measures at the WTO
DSM. See, e.g., Georges A. Cavalier, A Call for Interim Relief at the WTO Level: Dispute
Settlement and InternationalTrade Diplomacy, 22 WORLD COMPETITION 103-39 (1999). A very

recent article which addressed the problem of the absence of provisional measures to a certain
extent is Rachel Brewster, The Remedy Gap: InstitutionalDesign, Retaliation, and Trade Law
Enforcement, 80 Geo. WASH. L. REV. 102-58 (2011).
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present three arguments to justify the incorporation of provisional
measures at the WTO DSM. The first justification is that provisional
measures at the WTO DSM can ensure security and predictability in the
world trading system. In the absence of provisional measures, a
Member's rights and interests are affected by the adverse actions of the
violating Member. The absence of provisional measures highlights how
the DSM is incapable of preserving a particular Member's rights in the
course of a dispute, thus undermining the WTO's security and
predictability objectives. I provide a theoretical justification to
incorporating provisional measures at the WTO DSM.
In the second Part, I provide a second justification for provisional
measures predicated on the need to protect the rights of private
businesses underlying the world trading system. Though it is States as
Members of the WTO who enforce rights and obligations at the WTO,
the primary purpose of the WTO's existence is to support and facilitate
private business interests. My second justification, therefore, is that with
an objective to protect the underlying business interests of non-State
actors, there should be some form of provisional measures at the WTO.
I present the third argument for incorporating provisional measures
in Part II. The DSM under the WTO stands in stark contrast to the DSM
under the GATT. The judicialized nature of the WTO DSM and the
remedies under it has undoubtedly contributed to the effectiveness of
setting disputes in the multilateral trading system. I argue that equipping
the WTO DSM with provisional measures would further contribute to
its effectiveness and strengthen the DSM. Rather than a justification as
such, I present a comparative perspective on the need for provisional
measures by comparing the WTO DSM with other international dispute
settlement mechanisms such as the International Court of Justice, the
COMESA, and international investment arbitration. The objective is to
encourage WTO Members to incorporate provisional measures at the
DSM.
In order to demonstrate the practical utility of provisional measures
at the WTO DSM and the negative externalities due to the lack of
provisional measures at the WTO DSM, I discuss certain cases to
highlight this deficiency. I present this discussion in Part IV of this
Essay before concluding in Part V.
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II. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF PROVISIONAL MEASURES AS A REMEDY IN
DOMESTIC DISPUTE SETTLEMENT

A. Nature and Purpose of ProvisionalMeasures
In order to appreciate the need for provisional measures at the WTO,
it is imperative to understand the nature of provisional measures and
how it works in domestic dispute settlement. Impressing the need and
nature of provisional measures upon government officials who occupy
the negotiating is essential since these officials who are part of their
government bureaucracy would not easily understand and otherwise be
convinced of the need for provisional measures and aim at resolving a
given trade dispute in hand through diplomatic channels prior to
resorting to the adversarial method.
Provisional measures is primarily a restraining relief that is sought
by one of the parties to the dispute (usually the plaintiff) against the
other party (usually the defendant) from taking certain actions which
may be adverse to the interests of the plaintiff and may prejudice
adjudication of the suit.
To cite from Indian jurisprudence on the subject, the Honorable
Supreme Court of India has in the judgment of Zenit MataplastP. Ltd.
v. State of Maharashtraand Ors. 15 expounded:
23. Interim order is passed on the basis of prima facie findings,
which are tentative. Such order is passed as a temporary
arrangement to preserve the status quo till the matter is decided
finally, to ensure that the matter does not become either
infructuous or a fait accompli before the final hearing. The object
of the interlocutory injunction is, to protect the plaintiff against
injury by violation of his right for which he could not be
adequately compensated in damages recoverable in the action if
the uncertainty were resolved in his favour at the trial.
B. How ProvisionalMeasures Work
In a typical domestic suit, provisional measures are sought for the
plaintiff before the stage of litigation reaches final hearing or even
before the stage of leading evidence in some cases. In certain instances,
provisional measures are sought even before notice of the suit is served
upon the defendant by the court (ex-parte) at the time of the first
hearing. Provisional measures are often sought in property disputes to
prevent the creation of third party rights by the defendant in the suit
property, the absence of which may adversely affect the rights of the
15.

Mataplast P. Ltd. v. Maharashtra, (2009) 10 S.C.C. 388 (India).
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plaintiff and otherwise be prejudicial to the suit. Provisional measures
are also sought in intellectual property disputes where the plaintiff seeks
a motion from the court to restrain the defendant from committing
breach of the impugned IPR.
There are three basic principles which govern the grant of
provisional measures: irreparable harm or injury; balance of
convenience; existence of a prima facie case. In a typical suit where
provisional measures are being prayed for, the plaintiff has to establish
the following factors for the grant of provisional measures.
1. Existence of a Prima Facie Case
One of the very first conditions to be established by the plaintiff is
the existence of a prima facie case to justify the grant of provisional
measures. By the facts and circumstances of the case, the plaintiff has to
convince the court that the grant of provisional measures are imperative.
At this stage, the court is not required to evaluate in detail the merits of
the case and is required to only examine the facts of the dispute on the
face of it and arrive at a conclusion that provisional measures are
required. According to Black's Law Dictionary, the term prima facie
means "atfirst sight; on the first appearance;on the face of it; sofar as
to
can be judgedfrom the first disclosure;presumably; a fact presumed
6
contrary."'
the
to
evidence
some
by
disproved
unless
be true
2. Irreparable Harm or Injury
The most important ground to be proven by the plaintiff is to
demonstrate that irreparable harm and injury would be caused to the
plaintiff due to the actions by the defendant if such relief were not
granted by the court to the plaintiff till the disposal of the suit. Such
injury or harm has to be irreparable (i.e., it should be such that the
injury or harm complained of would be irreversible if immediate relief
was not granted). Preservation of the rights of the plaintiff till final
adjudication is the underlying objective.
3. Balance of Convenience
The principle governing the grant of provisional measures are
balance of convenience. In this, the plaintiff is required to provide that
the balance of convenience lies in the plaintiffs favor for the grant of
provisional measures. The need for provisional measures are to protect
the plaintiff against injury by violation of the plaintiff's right till the
final adjudication of the matter. However, it would be inequitable if the
16.

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY

1189 (6th ed. 1990).
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grant of provisional measures are only considered keeping in view of
the plaintiffs rights. Sufficient consideration has to also be given to the
defendant rights. To cite from Indian jurisprudence again, the
Honorable Supreme Court of India in GujaratBottling Co. Ltd. v. Coca
Cola Company17 stated:
The need for such protection has ... to be weghed [sic] against
the corresponding need of the defendant to be protected against
injury resulting from his having been prevented from exercising
his own legal rights for which he could not be adequately
compensated. The court must weigh one need against
8 another and
determine where the "balance of convenience" lies.'
The grant of provisional measures significantly depends on the facts
and circumstances of the particular dispute. Moreover, the above
principles are not exhaustive and in certain cases a defendant may cite
suppression of material facts or misrepresentation, or unclean hands to
defend a claim for provisional measures.
III. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR INCORPORATING PROVISIONAL
MEASURES AT THE DSM
A. A TheoreticalJustificationfor ProvisionalMeasures at the WTO
DSM.EnsuringSecurity andPredictability
My primary theoretical argument for provisional measures in the
WTO DSM is that the absence of provisional measures undermines the
security and predictability of the multilateral trading system. I base my
argument on two aspects of the WTO DSM: the delayed resolution of
disputes which when coupled with the insufficiency of remedies at the
WTO DSM is inimical to the DSM.
1. WTO Dispute Settlement: Ensuring Security and Predictability in the
World Trading System
One of the drawbacks of the GATT was that it was not designed to
achieve the twin objectives of security and predictability in the world
trading system. This was remedied to a large part by the creation of the
WTO. Thus, one of the centrally avowed objectives of the WTO is to
ensure "security and predictability in the world trading system."' 19 These
17. Gujarat Bottling Co. v. Coca Cola Co., (1995) 5 S.C.C. 227 (India).
18. Id.
19.

Edwini Kessie, EnhancingSecurity andPredictabilityfor PrivateBusiness Operators
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objectives are present, at least as a principle, in much of the WTO legal
text. For instance, a Member is legally prohibited from arbitrarily
changing its tariff commitments made in its respective Schedule of
Concessions.20
The objectives of security and predictability are also sought to be
achieved by the WTO's backbone, the DSM, and are specifically stated
in Article 3 of the DSU. The primary objective of the DSU as stated in
Article 3.2 is to ensure security and predictability in the world trading
system. The DSU has also identified promptness in resolving disputes
as a further objective of the DSM. 2 1 In this regard, one can say that the
DSU's putative objective would be to preserve the rights of WTO
Members.22 Indeed, the aim of any dispute settlement mechanism would
be to facilitate legal certainty 23.
In a commentary on Article 3 of the DSU, Peter-Tobias Stoll
explains the concepts of security and predictability. 24 Stoll insightfully
points out that security and predictability could be considered the very
purpose of law as such.25 He further explains the terms "security" and
"predictability." According to Stoll, "security can be understood as a
state of affairs in which one can rely on the ability of a legal and
institutional system to take care of one's rights and interests., 26 in
explaining predictability, Stoll points out that predictability adds a
dimension of time, and "indicates that the conditions, rules and rights
27
set up in the present will also be valid and enforceable in the future."
Stoll further cites the discussion by the panel in US-Section 301 Trade
Act on the importance of "security and predictability" which states:
Providing security and predictability to the multilateral trading
system is another central object and purpose of the system which
could be instrumental to achieving the broad objectives of the
Under the Dispute Settlement System of the WTO, 34 J. WORLD TRADE 1, 2 (2000).
20. Id. at3.
21. Donald McRae, Measuring the Effectiveness of the WTO Dispute Settlement System,
3 ASIAN J. WTO & INT'L HEALTH L. & POL'Y 1, 4 (2008), available at htttp://ssm.com/abstract
1140452.

22.

=

Virachai Plasai, Complianceand Remedies Against Non Compliance Under the WTO

System: Toward a More Balanced Regime for All Members, ICTSD DISPUTE SETTLEMENT AND
LEGAL ASPECTS OF INT'L TRADE ISSUE PAPER No. 3, at 1, 44 (2007).

23. Kofi Oteng Kufuor, From the GA TT to the WTO: The Developing Countriesand the
Reform of the Proceduresfor the Settlement of International Trade Disputes, 31 J. WORLD
TRADE 117, 117 (1997).
24. MAX PLANCK INST. FOR COMPARATIVE PUBLIC LAW AND INT'L LAW, MAX PLANCK
COMMENTARIES ON WORLD TRADE LAW: WTO INSTITUTIONS AND DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 286
(Rudiger Wolfrun et at. eds., 2006).
25. Id.
26. Id.

27.

Id.
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Preamble. Of all WTO disciplines, the DSU is one of the most
important instruments to protect the security and predictability of
the multilateral trading system and through it that of the marketplace and its different operators. DSU provisions must, thus, be
interpreted in the light of this object and purpose and in a manner
which would most effectively enhance it. In this respect we are
referring not only to preambular
language but also to positive law
28
provisions in the DSU itself.
I argue that the lack of provisional measures during dispute
settlement proceedings due to the delayed resolution of disputes and the
insufficiency of remedies renders the DSM less secure and predictable
for the DSM's participants than it would otherwise be.
2. Delayed Resolution of Disputes and the Insufficiency of Remedies:
Twin Aspects of the DSM That Undermine its
Security and Predictability
The nature of the system of settlement of disputes prescribed under
the DSU is unique. The DSU places subtle emphasis on prompt
compliance with the provisions of the covered agreements; prompt
settlement of the issues at hand and a non-confrontational approach
towards settlement of disputes by parties. Under the DSU, the stated
primary objective is usually to secure the prompt withdrawal of
measures complained of if they are found to
29 be inconsistent with the
provisions of any of the covered agreements.
In case consultations under Article 4 of the DSU fail and both parties
are not able to arrive at a MAS, the dispute proceeds to be heard by a
panel. Upon final adjudication of the dispute by the panel, and in case of
an appeal, by the Appellate Body, the report is circulated within the
DSB and then adopted by the DSB. The defending member is then
required to implement the rulings of the panel/AB within a reasonable
period of time, which is determined in accordance with the provisions
of Article 21 of the DSU. In the event the panel/AB rulings are not
implemented within a reasonable period of time, the respondent
Member may be required to provide mutually agreed compensation to
28.

Panel Report, United States-Sections 301-310 of the United States Trade Act 1974

7.75.
29.

Understandingon Rules andProcedures Governing the Settlement ofDisputes, WTO
INDEX:
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
UNDERSTANDING
art. 3.7, available at
http://www.wto. org/english/res e/booksp e/analytic index e/dsu_02_e.htm. It is clarified that
article 3.7 only uses the term "withdrawal." However, according to article 3.3 the "prompt
settlement" of disputes is described as essential. Hence a combined teleological interpretation
would lead one to believe that prompt withdrawal of non-compliant measures is essential.
ANALYTICAL
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the complainant Member. However, Article 22.1 of the DSU
particularly describes compensation as a voluntary and temporary
measure, placing compliance as the primary objective. If there is no
compensation forthcoming, then Article 22.2 provides that the
complaining WTO Member may seek authorization from the DSB to
suspend the application of concessions and other obligations under the
WTO agreements to the defending Member (i.e., retaliation).
It is thus clear that it is a long drawn battle for the complaining
member to avail of any relief before the conclusion of the dispute
settlement stage. Even after the panel/AB ruling is adopted, it may be
several months before the defending Member implements the rulings
and recommendations of the panel/AB. Even the measure of
compensation has been couched in discretionary terms. If there is no
compensation forthcoming, then the complaining member has to first
seek authorization from the DSB to retaliate. Even after this
authorization, the complaining Member may be forced to resort to
arbitration if the defending Member objects to the level of suspension
proposed, or claims that the proper principles have not been followed.
The remedies prescribed in the DSU are prospective in nature. There
is no scope of undoing what has already been done; the DSU just does
not contain provisions for the same. From a plain theoretical
perspective, it would thus appear that the defending Member may be
left 'relief-less' for a very long period of time. Before being tempted
into advocating the reform of the DSU timelines and thereby being
drawn into a different trajectory, the purpose of my comment above is
to highlight the same aspect of the DSM again-that the complaining
Member could be left without any remedy till the very end of the DSM
process, and the defending Member could choose to be in violation of
the provisions of the covered agreements till the stage of retaliation.
Again, the insufficiency of remedies in itself is not the sole problem;
insufficiency of remedies is linked to the delayed resolution of disputes.
It is therefore necessary to place the insufficiency of remedies in the
context of delayed resolution of disputes to understand how the same
undermine the security and predictability of the DSM. 30 Resolving
disputes according to the timelines envisaged and mandated in Article
20 of the DSU has not been adhered to in most cases. The DSM in
practice has taken more time than that prescribed under Article 20. I
discuss this aspect below.
Since its inception, the DSM has merited deep interest in its
functioning. Numerous studies have been taken to understand how the
30. This point of view has been advanced from a practitioner's perspective as well. See
generally Jacques H.J. Bourgeois, Some Reflections on the WTO Dispute Settlement System
from a Practitioner'sPerspective, 4 J. INT'L ECON. L. 145-54 (2001).
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WTO DSM has worked in practice. Among the several empirical
studies undertaken, some scholars have carried out studies to understand
the efficiency in terms of duration it has taken for the WTO DSM to
settle disputes. I discuss some of these findings arising from certain
empirical inquiries below.
Henrik Horn, Louise Johannesson, and Petros C. Mavroidis have
produced some interesting descriptive statistics on the WTO DSM
covering the years from 1995-2010.31 In their study, the authors have
identified that the duration of the panel stage of the dispute settlement
process has taken 14.7 months as against the statutory time line of the 6
months. The appellate process, which is expected to have taken 60 days,
has taken a close to 3 months to conclude.
Similar findings have been arrived in a recent and significant study
conducted by Rachel Brewster where she finds that "the time required
for WTO dispute settlement has expanded dramatically and the remedy
gap is far wider than the designers of the system seem to have
anticipated. 3 2 In her article, Rachel Brewster has estimated the average
time taken for the completion of the dispute resolution process for three
time periods (1995-1999; 2000-2004; 2005-2009) since the
establishment of 33the DSM. These are some of the key findings of
Brewster's study:
(1) the average time for completing the dispute resolution
where there was no appeal was 14 months (1995-1999), 16.1
(2000-2004), and 17 months (2005-2009); and
(2) the average time for completing the dispute resolution
where there was an appeal was 16.7 months (1995-1999), 19.6
(2000-2004), and 24.9 months (2005-2009).

process
months
process
months

34
With regard to the compliance panel stage, Brewster finds that:

(1) the average time for completing the dispute resolution
where there was no appeal was 5.1 months (1995-1999), 9.9
(2000-2004), and 9.5 months (2005-2009); and
(2) the average time for completing the dispute resolution
where there was an appeal was 7.8 months (1995-1999), 12.1
(2000-2004), and 17 months (2005-2009).

31. Henrik Horn et al., The WTO Dispute Settlement System
Descriptive Statistics, 45 J.WORLD TRADE, 1107-38 (2011).
32. Brewster, supra note 14, at 112.
33. Id. at 119.
34. Id.
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Brewster's study finds that there is a trend towards longer periods
of
35
time for completing each stage of the dispute settlement process.
It thus appears that the DSU suffers from a "design flaw." Indeed,
although the DSM was designed to ensure that the dispute settlement
process operated in a time-bound manner, the above studies show that
the DSM has in practice worked differently. Indeed, there are several
disputes which have taken a long time to be settled; the most prominent
example being the battle in the skies between the European Union and
the United States over subsidies granted to domestic aircraft
manufacturers.
Though the negotiators during the Uruguay Round might not have
anticipated deviations from the timelines prescribed in the DSU, it
would be important to note that the DSU is conspicuously silent in case
of non-adherence to the time-period for the panel process. 36 To better
understand the debilitating effect of the delayed resolution of disputes, it
is thus important to understand the shortcomings in the prospective
nature of the remedies at the DSM. As one commentator puts it:
The exclusively prospective nature of WTO remedies provides an
additional incentive for delay. A losing party faces no penalty for
dragging out the implementation process. For instance, since
panels do not award money damages, they cannot charge interest
(which acts as an incentive to comply and compensates the victim
for delayed implementation). Nor does the WTO system allow
for provisional remedies, which could encourage compliance and
protect the complaining Member from some of the harm caused
by delay.37
It appears that the the problem of duration can be attributed to two
types of factors: those inherent in the dispute system itself, such as the
long period of time set under the DSM and those factors caused
deliberately by the losing party to the dispute. 38 The remedy of
retaliation is available to a limited extent and risks being ineffective at
such a late stage in the dispute resolution process. 39 In light of these
factors, I emphasize the need for provisional measures for the broader
35.

Id.

36. See generally Gabrielle Marceau, NAFTA and WTO Dispute Settlement Rules: A
Thematic Comparison, 31 J. WORLD TRADE 44 (1997).
37. Brooks E. Allen, The Use of Non-Pecuniary Remedies in WTO Dispute Settlement:
Lessons for Arbitral Practitioners,in PERFORMANCE AS A REMEDY: NON-MONETARY RELIEF IN
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 281-310, 291 (Michael E. Schneider & Joachim Knoll eds.,

2011).
38. Mark Clough, The WTO Dispute Settlement System-A PractitionerPerspective, 24
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 252-74, 271 (2000).

39.

Id.
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benefit of the DSM and the WTO's Members, because provisions for
provisional measures would discourage dilatory tactics by a violating
member by preceding the final relief that would be awarded at the end
of dispute settlement process. In this regard, William Davey cites that
"[tihe possibility of provisional relief would have a very beneficial
effect in giving both parties an interest in the speedy resolution of
cases. ,,40
3. WTO Law as a Law of Expectations
To further justify my argument for provisional measures for private
business interests, I look to Chios Carmody's classification of a theory
of WTO law as a law of expectations. In his seminal work A Theory of
WTO Law,4 1 Carmody postulates WTO law to be a law of expectations:
The starting point of a theory of WTO law is the realization that
the principal aim of the WTO Agreement is the protection of
expectations. An example is a concession by the United States to
grant a certain tariff on textiles. The tariff is not about textile
imports today. Rather, it is a promise by the U.S. government to
treat textile imports in a certain way in the future. That promise
gives security to textile producers and exporters in foreign
countries that their goods will encounter a predictable kind of
treatment when entering the U.S. In effect, the tariff serves as a
basis for upstream decisions about investment, production and
exports. Producers and exporters may decide to invest in certain
machinery, or use certain inputs, or locate their manufacturing in
certain countries. Whatever the outcome, many decisions will
turn on the expectations created by the U.S. tariff.
As to whom these expectations belong, it might be thought that
expectations arising from WTO concessions or commitments are
the 'property' of the country or countries that actually negotiate
them. After all, those countries would be the ones most directly
involved in the negotiations and would be the most likely to
benefit. But as I will demonstrate, that is not at all the way in
which expectations have been interpreted under the WTO
Agreement. By virtue of the fact that the promises made under
the treaty give rise to complex interactions that cannot be neatly
disaggregated, it becomes effectively impossible to sort out
whose expectations arise from the operation of the treaty or who
40.

WILLIAM J. DAVEY, ENFORCING WORLD TRADE RULES: ESSAYS ON WTO DISPUTE

SETTLEMENT AND GATT OBLIGATIONS 94 (2006).
41. Chios Carmody, A Theory of WTO Law, 11 J. INT'L ECON. L. 527-57 (2008).
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should be compensated when they are breached.42
Carmody makes a simple yet effective point: WTO Members expect
each other to behave along the lines committed by them in the WTO
framework. This expectation is from a theoretical perspective, an
expectation of security and predictability in the multilateral trading
system.
B. Protectingthe "Private" in WTO Dispute Settlement Through the
Remedy of ProvisionalMeasures
One of the arguments I present to justify provisional measures in the
DSU is the need for protecting private business interests in the world
trading system. After all, the role of governments is merely to facilitate
trade and establish the governing framework of international trade,
whereas trade in itself is carried out by private business entities.
Sungjoon Cho illustrates this point lucidly in the following words:
The WTO system exists not merely for the intergovernmental
welfare between and among Members, but also for the interests
of the system's microparticipants such as consumers, producers
or farmers. In this regard, the rule of law in the WTO as a
collective, communal remedy . . . can eventually serve the

welfare and interests of individual economic players through
43
securing the stability and predictability of the WTO system.
Private parties, or non-Members, do not have any rights of action in
the WTO dispute settlement system. Needless to say, private parties do
not have the right to intervene in the proceedings of the DSM at any
given stage. However, certain panels and the AB in certain cases, by
interpreting the provisions of Article 13 of the DSU, have in effect
accorded recognition to private party interests by allowing the
submission of non-State amicus curiae briefs. However, the treatment
of amicus curiae submissions has not been uniform across cases, and in
certain cases, amicus curiae submissions have treated in a constricted
fashion by the panels and the AB. 44 Thus private business interests are
entirely dependent on the approach taken by their respective national
governments at WTO and at the DSM in achieving favourable outcomes
42. Id. at 542 (emphasis included).
43. Sungjoon Cho, The Nature Of Remedies In International Trade Law, 64 U. PITT. L.
REv. 763,799 (2004).

44.

For a recent perspective on amicus curiae briefs in WTO dispute settlement, see

Gabrielle Marceau & Mikella Hurley, Transparency and Public Participationin the WTO: A
Report Card on WTO TransparencyMechanisms, 4 TRADE L. & DEV. 19 (2012).
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in a given situation.
The main reason cited by scholars and practitioners against
participation of private parties or non-State actors in the WTO DSM is
that the WTO is primarily an inter-governmental organization. Being an
inter-governmental organization, critics have rejected calls for private
rights of action at the WTO DSM. In this Part, I do not intend to
evaluate this claim; rather I stress that the absence of private
participatory rights in the process apart from submission of amicus
curiae briefs makes provisional measures an important tool to safeguard
the interests of private parties. Edwini Kessie highlights this point
succinctly in the following words:
"[p]rivate business operators will be content with the dispute
settlement system of the WTO, if they were able to get effective
decisions within a reasonable period of time. Reforms should
concentrate on . . . making available remedies which would be

effective in compelling respondent45 Members to cease their
violations of the WTO Agreements."
My argument of "security and predictability" in section A is thus
closely inter-related to my argument of incorporating provisional
measures to protect the interests of the private sector. In essence,
security and predictability in the WTO can be construed to refer to the
objectives of security and predictability which the WTO is meant to
afford to private business interests. Private business interests expect a
framework in which their business can be conducted without any
immediate and unforeseen disruptions.
C. WTO DSM as the World Trade Court: A ComparativePerspective to
"Encourage" The WTO to ConsiderProvisionalMeasures
The DSM under the WTO has been likened to a world trade court.
Indeed, the imbibing of several court-like features to the DSM has
judicialized the system of dispute resolution under the WTO. As
Schoenbaum puts it, the WTO DSM now functions very much like a
court of international trade.46 In fact, this is the very reason why the
DSM has actually been successful over the many years. My third
argument is thus based on the idea that further judicialization of the
DSM will contribute to its further success: equipping the DSM with
more features from the domestic adjudicatory system will add to its
45. Edwini Kessie, EnhancingSecurity andPredictabilityfor PrivateBusiness Operators
under the Dispute Settlement System of the WTO, 34 J. WORLD TRADE 1, 11 (2000).
46. Thomas Schoenbaum, WTO Dispute Settlement: Praiseand Suggestionsfor Reform,
47 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 647, 648 (1998).
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effective functioning. To support the idea of equipping the DSM with
provisional measures it would be interesting to examine other
international dispute settlement mechanisms where provisional
measures exist.
The system of provisional measures is a significant feature in other
international dispute settlement mechanisms. Notable examples include
the International Court of Justice, the COMESA and most importantly
investment arbitration mechanisms. In this Part, I briefly explore the
existence of provisional measures in other international dispute
settlement fora.
1. International Court of Justice
The ICJ was established as a successor to the Permanent Court of
Justice which functioned under the aegis of the erstwhile League of
Nations. On a theoretical model, the International Court of Justice could
be seen to represent a successful judicialization of international dispute
settlement mechanisms between States. This "world court," has been
equipped with several court-like features, though some operate in a
different fashion when compared to the WTO dispute settlement
mechanism.
In the context of differences between the WTO DSM and the ICJ,
one difference in terms of remedies which distinguishes the ICJ and the
DSM is that the ICJ is equipped with powers to grant provisional
measures to complaining States. Article 41 of the Statute of the ICJ
under which the ICJ is established empowers the ICJ to indicate "any
provisional measures which ought to be taken to preserve the rights of
the respective party." 47 Since its establishment in 1945, the ICJ has
decreed provisional measures in a number of cases, the most famous
being in Germany v. United States of America (LaGrand). La Grand
was a dispute between Germany and the United States which centered
on the execution of two brothers- Karl La Grand and Walter La Grand
convicted and sentenced to death for the murder of a bank manager in
the state of Arizona. 49 Being German nationals, it was Germany's
contention that the brothers should have been informed about their right
to consular assistance under Article 36(1) of the Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations, 50 or their arrest and detention should have been
notified to the German Consulate. 5' However, neither of the brothers
47.
48.
49.

Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 41, Oct. 24, 1945, 33 U.N.T.S. 993.
Id. (stating that the Court can indicate provisional measures) (emphasis added).
LaGrand (Germany v. United States of America), Memorial of the Federal Republic

of Germany, vol. 1, 1999 I.C.J. I,
50. Id. 1.01.
51. Id. 2.01.

1.01, 2.01 (Sept. 16) [hereinafter Germany's Memorial].
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were aware of these rights, nor were they informed by their attorneys or
the state. 52 The German consulate became aware of the slated
executions of the La Grand brothers only in June 1992. After a series of
appeals, the execution of the La Grand brothers was confirmed. German
diplomatic efforts in stopping the execution of the brothers were
ineffective. On February 24, 1999, Karl LaGrand was executed by
administration of a lethal injection.
After a series of appeals, and clemency pleas, and after exhausting
all domestic remedies to prevent the execution of the remaining brother
Walter La Grand, Germany in a final attempt, on March 2, 1999 brought
an Application before the ICJ and requested indication of provisional
measures against the execution of Walter LaGrand. In its Application,
Germany alleged that the USA had violated the provisions of the
Vienna Convention in arresting and sentencing to death the La Grand
brothers, inter-alia, other allegations. Since Walter La Grand had
already been executed on February 24, 2009, Germany sought relief
from the ICJ, pending the final judgment that the United States take all
measures at its disposal to ensure that Walter La Grand was not
executed pending the final decision in these proceedings, also sought
that the United States inform the Court of all the measures which it has
taken in implementation of provisional measures.
The ICJ passed an Order 53 allowing Germany's Application and
unanimously decreed that the US take all measures at its disposal to
ensure that Walter La Grand was not executed pending the final
decision in the proceedings before the ICJ and inform the Court of all
the measures it had taken in implementation of the Order. 54 The Court
had also directed the Government of the United States to transmit the
Order to the Governor of the State of Arizona. 55 In allowing the
Application, the ICJ noted that in a request for the indication of
provisional measures, the ICJ need not finally satisfy itself of its
jurisdiction on the merits of the case, and could indicate provisional
measures if the provisions invoked by the Applicant appeared to prima
facie afford a basis on which the jurisdiction of the Court might be
founded. 56 The ICJ also noted that the slated execution of Walter La
Grand on March 3, 1999 would cause irreparable harm to the rights
claimed by Germany in the particular case (if a stay on the execution
was not granted).57 Citing the provisions of Article 75(1) of the Rules of
52.
53.

Id. 2.03.
LaGrand (Germany v. United States of America), Order, 1999 I.C.J. 9, 9 (Mar. 3)

[hereinafter ICJ Order].

54.

Id. 29.I(a).

55.

Id.

56.

Id. 13.

57.

Id. 24.

29.1(b).
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the Court, the ICJ recognized that the circumstances of the case required
it to proprio motu indicate provisional measures as a matter of the
greatest urgency. 58
However, in a most regrettable decision, the United States did not
pay heed to the unanimous Order issued by the 14 judges of the ICJ, and
the State of Arizona proceeded to execute Walter La Grand.
Germany's Application for a stay of Walter La Grand's execution
was one of grave urgency and should have been heeded by the United
States and its institutions. However, the purpose of discussing the La
Grand decision is not to be drawn into a debate as to the merits of the
decision or the legitimacy of the U.S. action. Rather, the purpose has
been to highlight the imperative need for provisional measures in the
WTO DSM. Of course, disputes before WTO panels do not involve the
execution of individuals. Nonetheless, situations of urgency-if not
grave and irreparable harm and injury exist which may prejudice the
participants of the DSM if there was not scope for provisional measures
at the DSM.
Other ICJ decisions which warrant interest in the context of the ICJ's
indication for provisional measures include an Application by Georgia
in the midst of the South Ossetian conflict with Russia where a prayer
for indication of provisional measures was made and was granted by a
narrow margin of 8:7 judges.
2. COMESA
A prominent pan-African economic institution in Africa, the
Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) was
established in December 1994 by the COMESA Treaty to replace a
preferential trade area which had existed from the earlier days of 1981
between Eastern and Western African economies. 60 Currently consisting
of 19 member states, the COMESA was established as an organisation
of free independent sovereign states and61 aims at achieving "economic
prosperity through regional integration."
A salient aspect of the COMESA is the establishment of a COMESA
Court of Justice under Article 7 of the COMESA Treaty. Having its seat
at Khartoum, the Court of Justice has been expressly recognized as the
backbone of the COMESA system. 62 The provisions governing the
58. Id. 26.
59. Germany's Memorial, supra note 49, 1.04.
60. Overview of COMESA, COMESA, http://about.comesa.int/index.php?option=com_
content&view-article&id=75&Itemid= 106.
61. Id.
62. COMESA Court of Justice, COMESA, http://about.comesa.int/index.php?option =
comcontent&view'-article&id=83 :comesa-court-of-j ustice&catid=43: institutions&ltemid=133.
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functions and jurisdiction of Court are contained in Chapter Five of the
COMESA Treaty (Articles 19 to 44).63

An important power that has been conferred upon the Court is the
prerogative under Article 35 of the COMESA Treaty to grant interim
orders and/or any other directions which the Court "considers necessary
or desirable." 64 Couched in broad terms, the Court, in instances of
urgency is empowered to "order temporary withdrawal of an offending
measure, or even grant an injunction against the implementation of the
measure to particular goods, before the determination of its legality in
accordance with the [COMESA] Treaty. '' 65 One commentator cites that
"indisputes between Kenya and Egypt, there were instances where
traders were caught unaware by measures implemented by either
country and would transport their goods only to be turned away at the
borders." 66 What is more interesting is that the right of action under the
COMESA Treaty has not been limited to Member States alone, rather
right of action has been made available any legal and natural person
who is 67
a resident in a Member State under Article 26 of the COMESA
Treaty.

The purpose of discussing the provisions for provisional measures
under COMESA, is to highlight the point that there exists a regional
trade treaty that has recognized the need for provisional measures in the
dispute settlement process. Particular emphasis should be placed that
the Court of Justice is based in third world. That there exists a DSM in
the third world which contains provisional measures should encourage
the WTO's Members and assuage concerns because of which Members
may be circumspect of introducing provisional measures in the WTO
DSM.
3. Investment Arbitration
The third dispute settlement mechanism for discussion is
international investment arbitration or investor-State arbitration
convened under the aegis of bilateral investment treaties. Primarily
initiated by investors, investment arbitration has come to be recognized
as a preferred though controversial route in seeking redressal of
grievances against host states in respect of their investments under the
applicable BIT. Most investment arbitrations are determined before
63.

Id.

64. Maurice Oduor, Resolving Trade Disputes in Africa: Choosing Between
Multilateralism and Regionalism: The Case of COMESA and the WTO, 13 TUL. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 177, 207 (2005).

65.
66.
67.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 202.
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either an ad-hoc arbitration tribunal or are initiated under an institution
such as the ICSID.
Given the nature of investment disputes, requests for provisional
measures by the claimant-investor are quite common. The grant of
provisional measures by the tribunal is facilitated by the presence of
provisional measures in most governing frameworks such as the ICSID
and the UNCITRAL.
According to Article 47 of the ICSID Convention, the investment
tribunal so formed may recommend any provisional measures to be
taken to preserve the specific rights of either party if it considers that the
circumstances so require, except as the parties otherwise agree. 68 Under
Rule 39(1) of the ICSID Arbitration Rules, any party may at any time
during the proceedings request provisional measures for the
preservation of its rights. 69 Interestingly, under Rule 39(3), the tribunal
measures or
may on its own initiative recommend provisional
70
recommend measures other than those requested for.

IV.

EXAMPLES OF DISPUTES THAT NECESSITATE THE NEED FOR
PROVISIONAL MEASURES

In order to understand the practical utility of, and the negative
externalities associated with, the lack of provisional remedies at the
DSM, it would be pertinent to discuss certain GATT/WTO disputes. I
discuss two disputes in this Part: E.U.-Seizure of Generic Medicines and
Norway - Trondheim Toll Ring. I do not debate the merits of these
disputes or discuss the jurisprudence of these disputes in detail; I instead
present the brief facts and highlight those circumstances which
necessitate the need for provisional measures at the DSM.
A. E.U.-Seizure of Generic Medicines
A dispute of recent times in the WTO's history is the E.U.-Seizure of
Generic Medicines. Besides having hit the headlines for reigniting the
debate on protection of IPR in trade versus developing country access to
medicines, the sudden seizure of consignments of millions of rupees
worth of drugs headed from India to Brazil underscored the need for
provisional measures at the DSM. The seizures of several consignments
of drugs manufactured by major Indian pharmaceutical including
companies such as Dr. Reddy's and Aurobindo Pharma by Dutch
68. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals
of Other States art. 47, Oct. 14, 1966, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159.
69. Id.
70. Id. r. 39(3).
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customs authorities on grounds of alleged patent infringement alarmed
both Indian and Brazilian interests. In India's request for consultations,
India had pointed out that around 19 consignments of generic drugs in
transit through the Netherlands had been seized by customs authorities
in 2008 and 2009, with 16 consignments originating in India.71 The
seized consignments were either destroyed or returned to India. 72 In
keeping with the spirit of the DSU, India's request for consultations
resulted in a continued negotiations that saw the issue being resolved by
way of
a mutually accepted solution between the EU and India in July
73
201 1.

However, the incident raised its ugly head again in January 2012
when Dutch customs authorities again seized 29 consignments of Indian
generic medicines headed to South America. 74 Covering the recurrence
of the seizures in January 2012, the Business Standardreported:
Domestic drug makers, who were relieved after the European
Union assurance in July 2011 to end the seizure of Indian generic
drugs in transit, were in for a shock last month when Dutch
authorities seized 29 cartons of medicines destined to South
America from India.
Timely intervention of Pharmaceutical Export Promotion Council
(Pharmexcil) and the Ministry of Commerce ensured that the
cartons, shipped by Mumbai based Ajantha Pharma, got cleared
within two weeks, but the recurrence of the seizure has shaken
the confidence level of Indian drug exporters.75
Though the incident was resolved by way of an MAS in July 2011
between the India and the EU, the sudden seizure of the drug
consignments-both in 2009 and 201 1-clearly undermined the
security and predictability of the world trading system. Both Indian and
South American trade interests were affected by the impugned measures
significantly and quickly. The presence of provisional measures would
have enabled India to initiate proceedings to receive immediate relief
71. Request for Consultations by India, European Union and a Member State - Seizure of
Generic Drugs in Transit, WT/DS408/1, (May 19, 2010), http://www.worldtradelaw.net/cr/
ds408-1%28cr/o29.pdf.
72. Id.

73.

Press Release, Press Information Bureau, Government of India, India EU Reach an

Understanding on Issue of Seizure of Indian Generic Drugs in Transit (July 28, 2011),

http://pib.nic.in/newsite/erelease.aspx?relid=73554.
74. Joe C. Mathew, Dutch Customs Seize Indian Drugs in Transit, Industry Frets, Bus.
STANDARD
(Jan. 23, 2012), http://www.business-standard.com/article/companies/dutch-

customs-seize-indian-drugs-in-transit-industry-frets- 112012300081
75. Id. (emphasis added).
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from the world trade court.
B. Norway-Trondheim Toll Ring
The Norway - Trondheim Toll Ring 76 dispute dates back to the days
of the GATT. The Norway--Trondheim Toll Ring is a dispute based on
the provisions of the Agreement on Government Procurement. 77 Cause
of action arose in March 1991 when the Norwegian Public Roads
Administration announced that the toll ring planned for the city in
Trondheim would be based on an electronic toll collection system and
that a contract had been concluded with a Norwegian company, Micro
Design relating to parts of this system. 78 The contract was characterized
79 and foresaw a budget of
as a research and development contract
80
around 28.5 million Norwegian Kronor.
No tender notice was issued for the electronic toll system contract
nor were any tenders or offers invited from companies other than Micro
Design. 8 1 A complaint was brought on this reason before a GATT panel
by United States, in whose view Norway had failed to conduct the
82
procurement in compliance with its obligations under the GPA.
According to the United States, the single tendering of the procurement
could not be justified under any of the provisions of the GPA and
Norway had also failed to meet the general requirement of Article 11:1
that the products and suppliers of other GATT contracting parties be
accorded treatment no less favourable than that accorded to domestic
products and suppliers (i.e., national treatment).8 3
The United States requested the panel to find that Norway had
violated its obligations under the GPA in the conduct of the
procurement of toll collection equipment for the city of Trondheim and
requested the panel to recommend that Norway take the necessary
measures to bring its practices into compliance with the GPA with
regard to this procurement. 84 An important aspect of this dispute is that
the United States also requested the panel to recommend that Norway
negotiate a MAS with the United States that took into account the lost
opportunities in the procurement of American companies which were
76. Report of the Panel, Norway - Procurement of Toll Collection Equipment for the
City of Trondheim, GPR.DS2/R (May 13, 1992), GATT B.I.S.D. 40S/319 (1992) [hereinafter
Panel Report].
77. Id.
78. Id. 2.1.

79.

Id.

80.
81.
82.

Id.
Id.
Id.

83.

Id. 3.1(i),(ii).

84.

Id.

2.2.
2.5.
3.1.
3.2.
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85
willing and eager to bid for the contract.
An important submission made by the United States was that in
requesting the panel to recommend that Norway negotiate a MAS, the
United States clarified that it was not asking the panel to recommend
"retroactive compensation." 86 The United States submitted that the
GPA, unlike other trade agreements did not deal with trade flows, but
rather with events; the opportunity to bid in public contracts.87 If a
contracting party decided to ignore the tenets of the GPA in a particular
case, the purpose of the GPA would be nullified. 88 "In such cases, a

standard panel recommendation that the offending Party bring ...its

rules and practices into conformity with its obligations would not, by
itself, be a sufficient remedy, and would not provide a sufficient
deterrent effect, especially if it were felt that it would not be appropriate
to order that procurements be annulled and recommenced." 89
The Panel found that the single tendering of the contract by the
Norwegian Public Roads Administration was violative of the provisions
of the GPA. 90 The Panel "concluded that Norway had not complied with
its obligations under the Agreement in the conduct
of the
92
procurement, 91 including the national treatment principle.
After its findings, the Panel then turned its attention to the
recommendations that the United States had requested.93 In regard to the
U.S. request that the Panel recommend that Norway take the necessary
measures to bring its practices into compliance with the Agreement with
regard to the Trondheim procurement, the Panel noted that all the acts
of non-compliance alleged by the United States were acts that had taken
place in the past. 94 According to the Panel, the only way that Norway
could bring the Trondheim procurement into line with its obligations
under the GPA would be to recommend that Norway annul the toll
contract awarded to Micro Design and recommence the procurement
process. 95 The Panel did not consider it appropriate to make such a
recommendation. According to the Panel, recommendations of this
nature had not been within customary practice in dispute settlement
under the GATT system and the drafters of the GPA had not made
85. Id. One of the prospective bidders for the Trondehim electronic toll system was an
American company called Amtech.
86. Id. 3.33.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90.

Id. 4.14.

91.

Id.

92.
93.

Id.
Id.

94.
95.

Id.
Id.

4.15.
4.17.
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specific provision that such recommendations be within the task
assigned to panels under standard terms of reference. 96 Moreover, the
Panel considered that in the case under examination such a
recommendation might be disproportionate, involving 97
waste of
resources and possible damage to the interests of third parties.
The determination of the panel against the recommendations sought
by the United States was justified on sound logic. The Panel correctly
determined that it was not empowered under the GATT/GPA to
recommend retroactive relief nor would it be efficient (to recommend)
that Norway take steps that took into account the lost opportunities in
the procurement of American companies, which were willing and eager
to bid for the contract. It is not the purpose of this paper to go into a
detailed evaluation of this case or the Panel report on the relief sought
by the United States. Instead, I highlight how the lack of provisional
measures in the GATT DSM caused irreparable injury and harm to the
United States. It is more important to note that injury and harm was
caused to American private companies that were interested in bidding
for the electronic toll system. Retroactive relief in such a case would
have been clearly inefficient as the Panel has correctly noted. Hence, it
is argued that if there was a system of provisional measures it would
serve the GATT system and its participants better.
V. CONCLUSION

The WTO's DSM is what makes it work; it is what oils the wheels of
international trade. The DSM has indeed delivered commendable results
since its inception in 1995. However, rather than allowing complacence
to creep in, WTO Members must sustain attention on identifying
weaknesses in the system and continue efforts to strengthen the DSM
which has been identified as the WTO's cornerstone.
Indeed, the smooth functioning of the DSM risks being undermined
if it does not adjust to the realities of the world trading system. Security
and predictability, which are the putative objectives of the DSM, risk
being compromised if a violating Member is allowed to prolong
violations of WTO law without the risk of any sanctions till the
conclusion of the adjudicatory process, and more so if lengthy
deviations from timelines envisaged in Article 23 of the DSU process
become the norm, rather than the exception.
Reform of the DSM is imperative. Remedies need to be revisited.
The system of remedies in the DSM is not a matter of concern just for
the trading nations, but most importantly for the private business
96.
97.

Id.
Id.
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interests, who are the underlying microparticipants of the multilateral
trading system. After all, it is not governments who trade, but private
business interests. Accordingly, I have argued for a need for provisional
measures in the DSM given the absence of private rights of action in the
DSM. 98 Edwini Kessie highlights this point very well: "It is highly
unlikely that private business operators will have access to the dispute
settlement system of the WTO in the short to medium term. However,
this should not prevent the adoption
99 of measures that will enhance
security and predictability for them."
The views put forth in this Essay may be criticized for being too
idealistic, and ignoring the practical realities of the functioning of the
international trading system. Furthermore, with provisional measures
having unfortunately been given the back seat in the current DSU
negotiations since provisional measures find no space in the Chairman's
draft DSU text of 2008, one might call the proposal for provisional
measures at this stage anachronistic. However, for the various
justifications that I have attempted to provide in this Essay, it is
earnestly hoped that there might be another opportunity of discussing
provisional measures in the negotations on reforming the WTO dispute
settlement mechanism.

98.

Alberto Alemanno emphasizes:

As private business operators bear most of the economic costs of noncompliance, there is an increasing pressure for a more direct involvement of
these parties in the Dispute Settlement System mechanism. The challenge is
therefore to find a way to accommodate their interests within the current
settlement system, without reducing the discretion WTO Members enjoy in
the implementation of the reports.
Alberto Alemanno, Private Parties and WTO Dispute Settlement System, in 2 ESSAYS ON THE
FUTURE OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 245, XXVIIl (Julien Chaisse & Tiziano Balmelli
eds., 2008), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=1 095705.

99.

Kesie, supra note 19, at 11.
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